Translating Health IT Policy into Practice in the UK National Health Service by Currie, Wendy L.
Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 1
12-31-2014
Translating Health IT Policy into Practice in the
UK National Health Service
Wendy L. Currie
Audencia, Nantes, Ecole de Commerce, wendycurrie1@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis
This material is brought to you by the Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Scandinavian Journal of
Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Currie, Wendy L. (2014) "Translating Health IT Policy into Practice in the UK National Health Service," Scandinavian Journal of
Information Systems: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol26/iss2/1
Translating Health IT Policy into Practice in the UK National Health
Service
Cover Page Footnote
I would like to thank all the people who agreed to be interviewed in the UK NHS (IT vendors, patient groups
and media/journalists) for this research over a ten year period whose names are too numerous to mention
here.
This article is available in Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems: http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol26/iss2/1
© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2014, 26(2), 3–26
Translating Health IT Policy into Practice in the 
UK NHS 
Wendy L. Currie
Audencia, School of Management, France
wcurrie@audencia.com
Abstract. The challenge to provide a nation-wide integrated health service is central to UK 
government policy. The National Program for Information Technology was launched in 2002 
to transform healthcare using information and communications technology. As the largest, 
non-military, non-scientific government funded IT program worldwide, it was planned over 
a decade with an estimated total cost expected to exceed £20bn. This paper is a longitudi-
nal study of the National Care Record Service, which was the largest part of the program, 
aimed to provide 50 million UK (English) citizens with an electronic health record. Using 
episodic interviewing techniques over ten years and secondary source material, the find-
ings reveal a series of IT policy changes to the original Program. Delays to roll out electronic 
health records are linked to issues about procurement strategies with IT suppliers, benefits 
realisation, risk assessment and clinical engagement.  This study extends academic work 
on the deployment of large scale, long-term publicly funded IT projects, which go beyond 
the technical imperative to transform healthcare. Findings suggest government agencies 
need to embed cultural, social and economic criteria into health IT policy-making. Track-
ing this Program for a decade, we observe how a centralised, top-down approach was re-
placed by localised IT procurement and implementation, giving NHS organisations more 
decision-making powers. However, the Program was beset by continuous policy changes 
affecting the structure, organisation and IT of the NHS, where attempts to achieve benefits 
finally resulted in the break-up of the Program. 
Keywords: Health policy, electronic health records, NHS, National Program for IT
Accepting editor: Margunn Aanestad
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1 Introduction
In 2002, the largest health IT program to date was launched to provide citizens with an elec-
tronic health record (EHR) (Wanless 2002). The antecedents of the National Program for IT 
(NPfIT) are found in previous health policies to modernise the National Health Service (NHS). 
Four decades of government White Papers and reports have all impacted on present-day health 
service delivery. Earlier reports emphasise the introduction of private-sector style practices into 
UK healthcare, and later reports promote IT to transform the NHS. Part of the rationale is to 
reduce costs, as expenditure on the NHS now exceeds £100bn per annum. Another reason is to 
develop government policy to provide citizens with more choice over their healthcare. Against 
this background, UK health IT policy has produced mixed results, often with unintended con-
sequences, as processes and services continue to be fragmented, rather than offered as part of 
an integrated health system (Brennan 2005, Greenhalgh et al. 2010, Currie 2012a). This study 
tracks the NPfIT over a decade to 2012. The focal technology is the National Care Record 
Service (NCRS) with a planned roll-out of EHRs for around 50 million citizens in England.
This research considers the vision, design and implementation of the NCRS. A key research 
question is: How is health IT policy translated in practical deployment of EHRs in the UK 
NHS? As there are few longitudinal studies on health IT policy (Scott et al. 2000), this study was 
planned over a decade where field work using episodic interviewing techniques, combined with 
significant secondary source data collection and analysis provides a rich picture of policy and 
practice. A significant contribution of this research is that, despite large investment in govern-
ment sponsored IT, the interplay between diverse clinical and non-clinical stakeholders, coupled 
with such an ambitious plan to introduce IT into the NHS, all conspire to impede rather than 
facilitate health IT policy. Part of this problem is the poor integration of the various strands of 
the program. In particular, the relationship between policy makers, professionals (clinicians, 
healthcare managers, IT professionals and the public) and reworking the service delivery pro-
cesses and practices between healthcare organisations (primary and secondary care) and external 
suppliers. 
The paper is divided into five sections. First, we consider the background to the research 
study. We note that, like other countries, the UK government is keen to develop health policy 
which uses IT as a primary vehicle to drive through change. We draw from relevant academic 
studies on the development, deployment and implementation of EHRs. Second, we introduce 
our methodology, based on longitudinal, episodic interviewing techniques. Since the NCRS is 
designed for all citizens in England, the range of interviewees was large, including health and 
IT professionals both inside and outside the NHS. Third, we discuss the findings from the 
case study. We organise the data around important themes, which emerge from primary and 
secondary data. We then discuss our findings in relation to other studies on large scale, govern-
ment funded IT projects, which suggest that adoption and integration is a highly complex and 
challenging process which goes beyond the technical imperative. Our study extends the body or 
work on health IT and offers several lessons for policy-makers and health professionals engaged 
in IT-related projects.
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2 Health IT policy
Research on health IT policy has increased steadily over the past two decades, with academic 
contributions on the development of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) from many different 
national, regional and local settings. EHRs are an integral part of health IT policy, with most 
countries developing an eHealth roadmap or strategy with target dates for adoption and imple-
mentation (Ellingsen and Monteiro 2012; Geissbuhler 2013). Many studies focus on specific 
issues and challenges, such as, incentives to adopt EHRs (DeRoches et al. 2012) and their dis-
ruptive capabilities (Blegind-Jensen and Kjærgaard 2010; Hill and Powell 2009; Blechman et al. 
2012), the digital divide across European Union Member States (Cruz-Jesus et al. 2012) patient 
data sharing and privacy (Jha et al. 2009; Exeter et al. 2013) benefits and risks (Goldzweig et 
al. 2009) clinical engagement with electronic records (Reich 2012, Wise and Bankowitz 2009), 
large scale health information infrastructures (Pedersen et al. 2012; Sahay et al. 2013; Melin and 
Axelsson 2014) and contracting (Hardless and Jaffar 2011) patient use of health information 
systems (Berg 2003; Suziedelyte 2012) and benchmarking eHealth performance across coun-
tries (Currie 2012b).
Over past decades, healthcare has witnessed a shift from medical professionalism, where cli-
nicians are represented by powerful professional organisations (Currie 2012a) to market-driven 
policies, using an increasing number of external suppliers for outsourcing IT work (Willcocks 
and Currie 1997). Our interest is not therefore confined to organisational and technical issues, 
but towards a wider health IT policy agenda to encourage cultural change within the medical 
profession and public at large. Against a background of relative under-investment over several 
decades, healthcare was considered a late developer in IT (i.e., compared with finance and man-
ufacturing). Recognising the potential of IT to modernise public health, the UK government in 
2002 pledged to spend around £6.2 bn on the NPfIT (Department of Health 2002) to deliver 
four large-scale IT-enabled projects:
1. a National Care Records Service (NCRS) for capturing, storing, retrieving and modify-
ing patient medical records on a national database; 
2. an Electronic Appointments Booking system (later becoming Choose & Book), where 
GPs and patients can book hospital appointments using a computer system; 
3. the Picture Archiving and Communications System (PACs) to capture and send digital 
images of x-rays and scans; and 
4. an Electronic Prescription Service (EPS) to enable patients to collect their prescriptions 
from hospital and high street pharmacies more efficiently. These systems would be sup-
ported by a new National Network (N3) to provide a ‘rapid, secure, robust and reliable’ 
network across the NHS. 
Despite a track record of poor performing large scale government IT projects, with often un-
predictable outcomes (Berg 2003) the NPfIT was intended to be the flagship program that 
would transform the NHS into a modern healthcare system fit for the 21st century. Part of the 
agenda was to encourage patients to be more active in their healthcare decisions, particularly by 
providing them with greater choice of services (Mark 2007). Patients were encouraged to change 
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from ‘passive recipients’ of government run services to ‘active consumers,’ which was part of a 
wider political agenda to recast the citizen as a customer (Mosse and Whitley 2008). This would 
increase health literacy among patients where they would be more engaged with health informa-
tion (Chinn 2011). In the case of the NCRS, citizens in England would be given an electronic 
record in the form of three distinct services. First, a Summary Care Record (SCR) would provide 
the essential elements of a person’s electronic record, extracted from general practice notes. This 
would also include other elements relating to that person from other healthcare providers where 
they receive care. Second, a Detailed Care Record (DCR) would contain the person’s electronic 
record for that organisation, and elements of all electronic records relating to that person from 
other organisations. Third, HealthSpace, would provide a personal health organiser and pro-
tected link to a person’s SCR provided they chose to have one. The NCRS was initially planned 
over a ten year period, with the intention that all citizens in England would have access to their 
record by 2010 (Connecting for Health 2004). Given a project of this magnitude, it was impor-
tant to design a research study that would capture the key decisions, events and outcomes of the 
project using both primary and secondary source data collection.
3 Methods
The study began in 2002 following the launch of the NPfIT. The research was planned over an 
initial five year period so it was important to select a methodology to capture longitudinal data 
from a variety of stakeholders (Denzin et al. 2005). A longitudinal approach enables repeat-
ed observations of phenomena over several months or years, which was important in research 
aimed at observing the introduction of a large scale ICT program planned over several years. 
The study was not initially intended to be ‘theory-driven’ as theories and concepts were likely 
to emerge from the data (Silverman 2006). Research into a large-scale healthcare ICT trans-
formation program necessitated an interview schedule to elicit data from several respondents 
including clinicians, managers, ICT providers, government agencies and patients of the system. 
The interviews were intended to capture the perceptions and views of respondents about the 
introduction of the electronic health record, and whether it would improve service delivery. 
So the aim was to focus on the complex relationship between health IT policy and practice, 
which extends beyond the organisational or departmental unit of analysis. Qualitative research 
methods are appropriate for policy and program evaluation and to provide an understanding 
of how and why certain outcomes are achieved, and also to answer important questions about 
relevance, unintended effects and impact of programs (Miles and Huberman 1994).
The research design was intended to capture events or episodes in the development, adop-
tion and implementation of the NPfIT across healthcare providers, mainly GP surgeries (prima-
ry care) and hospital Trusts (secondary care). An effective technique for achieving this objective 
is episodic interviewing, which captures data relating to concrete circumstances (time, space, 
people, events, situations). So in order to study a ‘concrete issue’ (Flick 2000, p. 77) such as the 
implementation of technology, the interview should meet three specific criteria: (1) It should 
combine invitations to recount concrete events (that are relevant to the issue under study) with 
more general questions aiming at more general answers (such definitions, argumentation and so 
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on) of topical relevance; (2) It should mention concrete situations in which interviewees can be 
assumed to have had certain experiences; (3) It should be open enough to allow the interviewee 
to select the episodes or situations he or she wants to recount, and also to decide which form of 
presentation he or she wants to give (for example, a narrative or a description). The point of ref-
erence should be the subjective relevance of the situation for the interviewee. The interviewing 
schedule lasted just under ten years. With a program as large as the NPfIT, it was not possible 
from the outset to predict the events or outcome of the NCRS. A total of 245 interviews were 
carried out with key health stakeholders, including, NHS Trusts, GPs, IT service firms, govern-
ment agencies and patient groups.
Many interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Interviews usually lasted around 1.5 
hours, and around one third were carried out over the telephone. A semi-structured question-
naire was used, although this was often altered as interviewees wished to digress to other issues 
and topics they felt were relevant to the study. While the focus of the research was on the adop-
tion and implementation of electronic records (the NCRS) as a means of integrating healthcare 
services across the NHS, the questionnaire topics were inevitably changed as the project reached 
(or failed to reach) specific milestones. For example, the delays and supplier problems which 
beset the NCRS became a key issue for NHS Trusts, and so needed to be incorporated into the 
questionnaire design for future interviews. 
While episodic interviewing aims to gather data from the same sites/respondents over a peri-
od of time, the opportunity to capture rich and detailed accounts of decisions and events enables 
researchers to develop a broader canvas than simply interviewing a few key personnel about an 
IT project at a specific point in time. By visiting hospital Trusts over an extended period of time, 
and re-interviewing the same personnel, it was possible to gather data about the key issues and 
concerns relating to the adoption and implementation of the NCRS. The results from the inter-
views are given in the following case study section below. Whilst qualitative methods using case 
analysis may provide generalisable results, the cases were not intended for comparative analysis 
but to give rich picture of how the NCRS was being adopted at each site and more widely across 
the NHS. 
To supplement the primary data collection, the researcher further compiled data from vari-
ous secondary sources (i.e., government publications, NHS Trust reports, media articles, health-
care websites, white papers and brochures from IT service firms, healthcare conference presenta-
tions, pressure group publications, etc). This material was invaluable as a source for providing 
different (and contradictory) views about the progress (or lack of it) from the NCRS planned 
implementation. 
4 Case study: The national program for IT in the UK 
NHS
Health IT policy has evolved from previous decades where electronic medical records (EMRs) 
were used primarily for clinical purposes (Garets and Davis 2005). As a subset of the NPfIT, 
which aims to “help deliver a better NHS that gives public and patients services that fit the 
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twenty-first century” (Department of Health 2002) (hereafter the DoH) the NCRS emerged 
from a series of policy documents which identified key strands in government policy to intro-
duce “lifelong electronic records of patients” (DoH 1998) Further government reports followed 
including the NHS Plan (DoH 2000) outlining an information strategy for the ‘modern NHS’ 
and Building the Information Core (DoH 2001) on how to implement the NHS plan. These 
publications precede the Wanless Report (2002) which spearheaded the health IT policy that 
launched the NPfIT in 2002.
4.1 Three phases of health IT policy
Understanding the history of the NPfIT is important, not only for reviewing the health IT 
policy, but also for gaining an appreciation of how the NHS is a political battleground which 
undergoes almost constant re-structuring and change. Our research begins in 2002, and con-
cludes in 2012. It captures a series of policy u-turns relating to the NPfIT which can be divided 
into three distinct phases (see Table 1). 
The primary aim of the NCRS is to enable healthcare professionals and patients access to an 
EHR. From the outset, the Program experienced a series of issues and setbacks. We discuss these 
challenges under five main areas which emerge from our data: implementation plan, procure-
ment, benefits realisation, risk assessment and clinical engagement.  
4.2 Implementation plan
As a highly ambitious Program to modernise health IT to achieve service improvement, the 
UK government initially divided England into five regions, or geographical areas. Leading IT 
suppliers would service one or more of these areas to deployment the NCRS. IT in the NHS 
would adopt a strategy of ‘rip-out and replace’ as the government pursed ‘ruthless standardisa-
tion’ in selecting both a narrow range of large IT suppliers and technologies to fulfil the plan to 
introduce EHRs across the NHS. Within the first phase of the NPfIT, the government set up an 
agency: Connecting for Health, to oversee the introduction of the Program. 
Within three years, there were calls for an independent review of the program. Concerns 
were raised by politicians and in the media about the slow progress. Various medical and IT 
groups including the British Medical Association and British Computer Society voiced concerns 
about finance, management and technology issues. While the media emphasised the financial 
and IT aspects (i.e., escalating cost to the taxpayer and technical challenges faced by IT suppli-
ers), medical and IT groups identified organisational and managerial setbacks (i.e., lack of clini-
cal buy-in to the program, vague business benefits, poor risk assessment, unwelcome changes to 
working practices, poor security of patient data). 
In 2006, the first of three National Audit Office Report (2006) reports was published. It 
highlighted shortfalls in the progress of the Program, but concluded it was still viable, despite 
being late. Among the concerns was the lack of progress of the NCRS as well as fears about 
protecting patient data, particularly where millions of patient records would be held on a large 
centralised database (called, the Spine) and potentially accessible to many thousands of NHS 
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staff. The issues raised were relevant and timely but did not go far enough in terms of un-pack-
ing some of the more serious structural, organisational, managerial and technical problems of 
the program. This was picked up in the media where continued criticism about ongoing delays, 
lack of clinical buy-in, missed targets, security and patient safety issues continued to damage the 
reputation of the NPfIT. 
Interviews with respondents from 2005-7 suggested that implementation problems were not 
confined to technical blips, but were much broader in scale and scope. This pointed to a lack of 
integration, not just between the various software systems operating within and across health-
care organisations, but also among clinical, managerial, and administrative groups, between 
the NHS and IT firms, and among policy-makers and implementation teams. One clinician 
commented:




Deployment of the NCRS 
planned for December 2004. 
Entire implementation plan 
for 2010. Program organised 
around five (geographical) 
regional areas of England.
Deployment of the NCRS 
extended to late 2006.
Five regional areas in England 
reduced to three (larger) areas.
Further delays to the NCRS. 





to ICT procurement in 
NHS. Procurement and 
development of ICT where 
NHS organisations maintain 
their own systems is seen as 
‘haphazard’1.
Contracts with two major 
suppliers terminated. Department 
of Health only pay suppliers 
‘services have been proven to have 
been delivered and working’.
Re-thinking of the 
procurement strategy, with 
only two major contracts 
with suppliers across the three 
program areas. Department 
of Health announces in 
2009 that a more ‘locally led’ 
approach to procurement 
will be allowed where NHS 
organisations will introduce 
‘smaller, more manageable 
change’ according to their 




Primary focus on letting 
contracts and practicalities of 
getting systems deployed.
Clinical Leads would be 
deployed in advocacy roles to 
help promote the aims and 
objectives of the Program. 
These individuals would assist 
in communicating the benefits 
of the NCRS to clinicians and 
other NHS stakeholders.
Enhanced focus on benefits 
realisation. Encourage Strategic 
Health Authorities and Trusts to 
achieve benefits from the NCRS.
SHA Chief Executives would 
serve as Senior Responsible 
Officers (SROs) for 
implementation and benefits 
realisation of the NPfIT
The plan to abolish SHAs by 
2012 poses additional risks 
as restructuring inevitably 
leads to confusion and time 
delays as NHS managers, staff 
and sub-contractors adapt 
their project plans within a 
new organisational structure. 
By 2011, it is unclear how 
the existing contracts will be 
managed up to 2016.
Table 1. The NCRS from 2002-2012 - Three Phases of Health IT Policy
1. NAO, 2006, p.1. 2. NAO, 2008, p.9. 3. NAO, 2008, p.9. 4. NAO, 2011, p. 5. 5. NAO, 2011, p.8
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Theme Phase I: 2002-2005 Phase II: 2006-2008 Phase III: 2009-2012
Risk Assess-
ment
Risk mitigation through 
centralised control of ICT 
strategy, procurement and 
deployment. Estimated savings 
from prices paid for goods and 
services to be £4.5 million. 
‘Big Bang’ approach to 
ICT introduction. NAO 
(2006) report offers 10 
recommendations to 
Connecting for Health. 
These included, ensuring 
that a robust engineering-
based timetable for delivery 
is introduced and capable of 
being met by the suppliers; 
better communication with 
NHS staff about how these 
changes will affect them; 
stronger management of 
supplier performance, 
including imposing penalties 
for late delivery; better 
quantification of the benefits 
delivered by the program; 
more understanding of how 
the NPfIT impacts on local 
NHS IT expenditure; a 
comparison of early adopter 
NHS organisations to use their 
experience to help identify 
and quantify the service and 
efficiency improvements of new 
systems; additional training 
and development programs, 
i.e. project management; the 
creation of more National 
Clinical Leads to drive through 
the change program; and 
building capabilities in NHS 
organisations through passing 
on best practices in areas like as 
contracts management. 
Five management challenges 
to support the delivery of the 
program: the importance of 
achieving strong leadership and 
governance; maintaining the 
confidence of patients that their 
records will be secure; securing 
the support and involvement of 
clinicians and other NHS staff; 
managing suppliers effectively; 
and deploying and using the 
systems effectively at local level 
(NAO, 2008). 
Estimated cost of Program is 
£12.7 billion3.  Report offers 
six recommendations offered to 
realise the ‘vision’ of the Program. 
Among them were closer 
communication between the 
NHS Connecting for Health and 
the Strategic Health Authorities 
(SHAs) with NHS organisations 
about the deployment plans of 
the NCRS. The lessons learned 
from the experiences of the three 
‘early adopter’ sites should be 
better communicated to other 
NHS organisations, particularly 
as plans to develop the Lorenzo 
system for the North, Midlands 
and East areas have been 
considerably delayed.
By 2011, expenditure on the 
Program estimated to be £6.4 
million1.
Recognition that introduction 
of the NCRS has proven to be 
‘more difficult’ than originally 
expected. 
Initial to plan to replace 
systems ‘wholesale’ is 
changed to one giving NHS 
organisations more control 
and decision-making in the 
selection and deployment of 
ICT. This move is expected 
to reduce risks associated 
with large public sector 
ICT projects. However, 
moving to a more localised 
approach will increase 
risks of lack of integration 
(interoperability) of ICT 
systems. It is recommended 
that interoperability will cost 
the Program around £220 
million5.
Table 1. The NCRS from 2002-2012 - Three Phases of Health IT Policy
1. NAO, 2006, p.1. 2. NAO, 2008, p.9. 3. NAO, 2008, p.9. 4. NAO, 2011, p. 5. 5. NAO, 2011, p.8
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Connecting for Health 
(the agency responsible for 
implementing the NPfIT - 
‘the Program) has appointed 
Clinical Leads to help secure 
engagement among clinicians 
and other relevant stakeholders. 
Despite the 1.2 million NHS 
staff, clinical engagement 
proves to be a difficult task. 
Many clinicians claim they 
have not been ‘involved’ in the 
decision-making process for the 
NPfIT, and that Local Service 
Providers (LSPs) charged with 
the implementation of IT 
systems, work closely with 
government agencies (i.e. 
CfH) rather than front-line 
clinicians who are ultimately 
expected to adopt the systems 
in their working lives. A culture 
of distrust develops which 
results in clinical resistance 
to the NPfIT. The NHS IT 
director-general, also recognises 
the need for enhanced clinical 
engagement.
Connecting for Health appoints 
a Chief Clinical Officer to 
enhance clinical leadership of the 
Program. The problems of poor 
clinical engagement continue, 
with many pressure groups 
and professional membership 
organisations (i.e. the British 
Medical Association) calling for 
better clinical engagement by 
involving more clinicians in the 
decision making on the Program. 
The National Clinical Leads 
continue to advocate support, yet 
increased media coverage about 
the problems of introducing the 
NCRS continue. 
An agreement was made in 2008 
between Connecting for Health 
and clinical stakeholders to 
provide a minimum specification 
of functionality, acceptable to 
clinicians in secondary care. 
This move was to improve 
clinical engagement among key 
stakeholders. 
From 2015-16 NHS trusts 
will take over responsibility 
for the NCRS. Stakeholder 
will need to become more 
fully engaged about the 
potential future costs of 
introducing and running 
the NCRS.  Currently, the 
NGS Trusts have no direct 
contractual relationship with 
existing suppliers and no 
information about the future 
cost of using care records 
systems after  2015.
A vital policy issue will be 
how to engage clinicians 
in working with existing 
and future suppliers and, in 
particular, involving them 
more in the decision-making 
about IT systems for clinical 
and non-clinical use.
Table 1. The NCRS from 2002-2012 - Three Phases of Health IT Policy
1. NAO, 2006, p.1. 2. NAO, 2008, p.9. 3. NAO, 2008, p.9. 4. NAO, 2011, p. 5. 5. NAO, 2011, p.8
“A program of this magnitude requires the full support of doctors and nurses, hospital 
managers, administrator and patients. There has been a lack of communication from the 
Department of Health about the purpose of electronic health record. What we need is a 
demonstration of how it will work in practice, not a full scale, nationwide IT program. 
I would like to see the clinical and business case for the NCRS.” (Hospital Consultant, 
Foundation Trust, London region)
The NCRS had an initial phased deployment timetable running from June 2004 to December 
2010. This target proved difficult and encountered political and practical problems. Our data 
from 2003-5 raises many issues about a lack of co-ordination and co-operation between the ma-
jor parties (i.e., the government agencies, NHS Trusts, IT suppliers and patient groups). Inter-
views with clinicians during this period revealed serious concerns with many claiming they were 
not fully up-to-date with government and hospital plans to introduce a nationwide electronic 
record to store patient data. A Chief executive summed up the main issues:
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“There is pressure to work with IT suppliers to develop the NCRS but I have serious 
budgetary constraints. I have therefore agreed to delay the implementation because I 
have other priorities. If local people have to wait a long time for a hospital appointment 
and read in the newspapers that we are spending hundreds of thousands of pounds on 
IT, they will think we have got our priorities wrong. I am a bit concerned about the tar-
gets and timescales, particularly as the IT suppliers are also learning on the job.” (Chief 
Executive, South region, NHS Trust)
From an initial ‘go-live’ implementation plan for 2010 to revised plan for 2014, a decision was 
taken in 2011 to relax the plan where NHS Trusts would be given more flexibility and con-
trol of their own IT systems (NAO 2006; 2008; 2011). Following the election of a coalition 
government, the health minister Simon Burns in 2010 remarked, “a national approach is no 
longer required” and a procurement “more locally-led” “modular” systems approach will be 
promoted” (www.e-health-insider.com). The IT policy shifts are discussed in the following 
sections. 
4.3 Procurement
As a major IT policy initiative to transform healthcare services in England, the introduction of 
the NCRS was a far-reaching goal for the NHS.  Our findings show the initial strategy from 
2002 to 2008 focused more on procurement of technology rather than identifying business 
methods and tools to measure benefits and risks. An issue that was repeatedly raised by inter-
viewees was the relationship between the NHS and third party IT suppliers. The NPfIT was 
an ambitious outsourcing initiative with large IT providers and their sub-contractors develop-
ing and implementing the NCRS across large geographical regions. The infrastructure of Na-
tional Application Service Providers, Local Service Providers and independent software vendors 
amounted to a risky strategy where problems reflected the scale and scope of the work around 
the IT architecture and applications. The focus of Connecting for Health to enter into tough ne-
gotiations with suppliers to procure systems at a discounted rate was only one part of the jigsaw. 
Another part was evaluating the level of maturity and capability of suppliers, not only to work 
with the NHS but also to co-ordinate and co-operate among themselves. Unfortunately, the 
burden of meeting ambitious performance targets proved too challenging for some IT suppliers. 
First, Accenture, then, Fujitsu, terminated their contracts with Connecting for Health. This was 
met with more negative media coverage about the Program, and questions about whether it was 
too large to be fully implemented. 
As healthcare was a ‘follower’ in IT adoption, rather than a ‘leader’, the years of under-in-
vestment in IT, particularly in secondary care (Brennan 2005, Currie and Guah 2007), pointed 
to low IT maturity (both at the supplier and customer levels). Assessing the maturity of both the 
customer and the IT supplier is critical for large scale IT initiatives, as low IT maturity usually 
results in resistance from staff and low morale, with the outcome being low adoption. Also, 
evaluating IT supplier capabilities to deliver on promises is important, particularly given the 
‘hype’ surrounding IT. Respondents voiced mixed views about the capabilities of IT suppliers, 
especially during the selection phase, 
10
Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 26 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol26/iss2/1
Translating Health It Policy Into Practice In The UK NHS • 13
“Two large IT suppliers tendered for the contract. It was common knowledge that since 
one had already been given a large contract in another region, it was unlikely they would 
be awarded this contract. I think the decision had already been made when they came to 
give their presentation to staff. My concern was that while the supplier was knowledgea-
ble about technology, they didn’t appear to understand much about the workings of the 
NHS.” (Hospital Doctor, NHS Trust, Southern region).
Our findings suggest that, as a ‘late adopter’ of IT compared with other sectors like financial 
services and manufacturing, IT capabilities across the NHS varied greatly, making the intro-
duction of electronic records highly challenging. The NHS was playing ‘catch-up’ with IT, yet 
centrist, top-down health IT policy appeared not to win hearts and minds of key stakeholders, 
particularly clinicians’ with concerns about patient safety. Criticising the centrist approach, cli-
nicians commented: 
“Having worked in general medicine for thirty years, I think the best IT systems are 
those that are developed and introduced locally, particularly with partnerships between 
clinicians and technology firms. A centrist strategy is designed to achieve uniformity and 
standardisation of the technical solution, but healthcare is a complex business, unlike 
banking and airlines.” (Hospital Doctor, NHS Trust, North West region).
“At our hospital, we have traditionally implemented IT at the localised level. I am not 
sure that central planning for IT is the way forward. You need to get everybody on board, 
clinicians and administrators alike.” (Hospital Consultant, North West region, NHS 
Trust)
4.4 Benefits realisation
One area which was given less attention at the outset of the Program was benefits realisation. 
Lack of communication about the business benefits of the program was evident, despite the De-
partment of Health employing Clinical Leads in advocacy roles. Against a background of con-
stant restructuring of the NHS organisation, an important question was: Who is responsible for 
implementing the Program? In 2006, the Acting NHS Chief Executive stressed that SHA Chief 
Executives would serve as Senior Responsible Officers (SROs) for implementation and benefits 
realisation of the NPfIT. They were expected to put into place, implementation programs to 
identify benefit streams. This was a move to ensure senior support for the NPfIT in the hope of 
reducing further delays. In addition, the centrist approach to procuring IT services was modified 
to include the National Local Ownership Program (NLOP). This was designed to align gov-
ernance arrangements with the SRO roles; to clarify roles and responsibilities; strengthen local 
governance and ownership to achieve the right balance between national and local needs; estab-
lish structures and processes to ensure mutual accountability; reinforce the value from NPfIT; 
define and implement clinical engagement; and improve NHS Connecting for Health program 
decision-making capability. The NLOP was intended to encourage ‘buy-in’ to the program from 
managers and staff at local level. The NLOP aimed to clarify the issues around accountabili-
ty and responsibility for the NPfIT. More senior level NHS engagement in the program was 
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sought, yet Connecting for Health would continue to be responsible for the NPfIT commercial 
strategy and contractual negotiations. SHAs in three groups (London, South, North East and 
Midlands) would work together to achieve the strategy.  
In 2008, a second National Audit Office report was published which evaluated the progress 
of the NPfIT in the previous two years. It stressed that, “the context within which the Program is 
being delivered is complex and constantly changing, with new requirements arising from policy 
and operational changes in the NHS” (National Audit Office 2008, p. 7). Since 2006, there had 
been many centrally imposed structural changes governing the Program, such as the planned 
reduction of Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) from over 28 to only 10, and a reduction in 
the five regional areas or clusters to only three. 
Restructuring of the NHS led one senior consultant to comment: 
“If the SHAs are now to be reduced, then I am not sure how the NHS will manage the 
introduction of the NPfIT. AT my hospital, we have good IT systems and are not in any 
hurry to replace them. I think we should have more control over our IT strategy and the 
end game is about patient care, not replacing IT for the sake of it.” (Senior consultant, 
NHS Hospital, Southern England).
4.5 Risk assessment
From the outset of the NPfIT, data security and confidentiality became central to the adoption 
and implementation of the NCRS. Clinicians currently generate records for encounters or ep-
isodes of care. These records are accessible to, and shared by, the immediate team (primary and 
secondary care). For the NCRS to work, it would need to be supplemented by key information 
from other organisations that provide care to patients. The combined patient record from one 
organisation (i.e., GP practice) with information from other healthcare providers (i.e., second-
ary care) would comprise the Detailed Care Record. But where two providers shared an integrat-
ed local record, a care professional at one provider would not be able to access the whole record 
held by another provider. Data capture, input, retrieval, manipulation and sharing are all part of 
the NCRS, but who has access to a patient’s record is a critical element in the data security and 
confidence of the system. For example, in addition to NHS staff, a patient attending an NHS 
appointment at one provider (i.e., hypertension clinic) would expect that all health professionals 
who provide care may contribute to their record by inputting data. A receptionist may record 
the date/time of an appointment. A clinician may upload clinical notes to the record. The record 
will be available to that organisation on a need-to-know basis (i.e., through role based access and 
a legitimate relationship). When a patient is referred to another NHS provider, unless he or she 
chooses to limit participation, that provider would have access to all or part of their NHS Care 
Record. The organisation may choose only to access the SCR on the basis of ‘implied consent’
When the patient attended several NHS appointments for more complex care, it would be 
necessary for all these organisations to access all or some parts of the aggregate contribution 
to the Detailed Care Record. This data would facilitate NHS staff to carry out clinical and 
non-clinical activities enabled by shared access to the record (i.e., ordering tests/monitoring 
results). Wider access to the record would require ‘explicit consent’ of the patient, although in 
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time, this level of access may become implicit (The implied/explicit patient consent issue be-
came highly contentious in the media as health professionals and pressure groups increasingly 
raised concerns about data security and confidentiality). As the program continued, the policy 
became increasingly blurred with the government finally agreeing to contact all patients whose 
NHS care record would be stored electronically.  However, little attention was placed on those 
patients who opted out, and how this would impact the NCRS overall. The British Medical 
Association commented that,
“Whilst the BMA supports the sharing of information to improve patient care, we are 
disappointed that the architecture of a system, which will have huge implications to the 
delivery of healthcare, was commissioned and built prior to stakeholder consultation” 
(www.BMA.org.uk).
A similar note of caution was expressed by the Information Commissioner’s Office who claimed 
to receive a number of enquiries from the public relating to the introduction of EPRs in Eng-
land. Thus, “Many of these individuals have expressed concern at the plans and are worried that 
their health records will be available to everyone across the NHS” (Information Commissioner’s 
Office 2007). These sentiments were raised in our interviews:
“The policy seems to be very confused. I think patients should be given clear guidance 
about their electronic record. I think some patients are likely to opt-out because they 
don’t know enough about what data is being collected about them.” (Hospital Doctor, 
London).
“I don’t want my records on a computer. I am worried that anyone can get hold of my 
health records if they want to. I know it may never happen but the fear is still there. Also, 
I don’t feel that either have strength or time to learn technology. I am too old for this.” 
(A patient from West Midlands’s region).
An academic evaluation of the summary care record looked at the early adopter sites focusing on 
the organisational issues, rather than business and technical issues (Greenhalgh et al. 2010). The 
study identified low adoption and usage of the SCR, with few citizens accessing the Healthspace 
government website. It further stressed that much of the work around patient consent about 
their record, should have taken place much earlier, i.e., prior to IT suppliers being commis-
sioned to develop the system. 
4.6 Clinical engagement
An ongoing theme from interviewing clinicians was their feeling that politicians and NHS exec-
utives had not consulted them in the decision-making process on the NPfIT. One clinician said,
“I am very used to working with electronic medical records, but the NCRS needs to be 
more fully explained if clinicians are to use it. My concern is patient safety. I am not as 
interested in the cost reduction aspects of it...if there are any....but I am concerned about 
who has access to the electronic record and how data inputs can be changed. I have never 
seen a clinical or business case for the Program”. (A Hospital Consultant, London.)
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Clinical engagement was a theme in two NAO reports. First in 2006, an NAO report proposed 
10 recommendations. These included, ensuring that a robust engineering-based timetable for 
delivery is introduced and capable of being met by the suppliers; better communication with 
NHS staff about how these changes will affect them; stronger management of supplier perfor-
mance, including imposing penalties for late delivery; better quantification of the benefits deliv-
ered by the program; more understanding of how the NPfIT impacts on local NHS IT expend-
iture; a comparison of early adopter NHS organisations to use their experience to help identify 
and quantify the service and efficiency improvements of new systems; additional training and 
development programs, i.e., project management; the creation of more National Clinical Leads 
to drive through the change program; and building capabilities in NHS organisations through 
passing on best practices in areas like as contracts management. 
Second in 2008, an NAO report identified five management challenges to support the deliv-
ery of the program: the importance of achieving strong leadership and governance; maintaining 
the confidence of patients that their records will be secure; securing the support and involve-
ment of clinicians and other NHS staff; managing suppliers effectively; and deploying and using 
the systems effectively at local level. Six recommendations were offered to realise the vision of the 
Program. Among them were closer communication between the NHS Connecting for Health 
and the Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) with NHS organisations about the deployment 
plans of the NCRS. The lessons learned from the experiences of the three ‘early adopter’ sites 
should be better communicated to other NHS organisations, particularly as plans to develop the 
Lorenzo system for the North, Midlands and East areas have been considerably delayed. 
Interviews with clinicians suggested a change in emphasis between the earlier years of the 
Program (2002-5) and the later years (2006 onwards) where clinical engagement became a pri-
ority. A clinician suggested, 
“I think my clinical colleagues are very supportive of electronic records. But it is critical 
that we are involved in the implementation of IT. Otherwise, we won’t use it. The prob-
lem with this Program is that clinicians were virtually left out of the political process, and 
the media has picked this up”. (Clinician, North of England.)
5 Discussion and analysis
Tracking the NPfIT over a ten year period using a longitudinal case study method raises several 
issues about how health IT policy is translated into practice. Our study contributes to existing 
longitudinal IS research on the adoption and implementation of large scale IT programs into 
national healthcare settings (Greenhalgh,et al. 2010, Mark 2007; Currie and Guah 2007; Hen-
dy et al. 2005; Hendy and Barlow 2013). Within the IS field, many studies have utilised the 
organisation or department as the unit of analysis for investigating health IT implementation. 
Our study extends this work by looking at how government policy is translated into practice at 
multiple levels of analysis, including, NHS organisations (hospitals and GP practices) IT con-
sultancy firms and patient representative groups. Our findings reveal that, rather than following 
a linear pathway from program design to testing and implementation, the NPfIT was charac-
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terised by many unforeseen policy changes and ‘u turns’ as key decision-makers faced a series of 
challenges, notably, unrealistic implementation timescales, the breakdown of contractual rela-
tionships between contractor and suppliers, disappointing benefits realisation, inadequate risk 
assessment, and low clinical engagement. These issues were raised in many government reports 
which evaluated the progress of the NPfIT. However, the solutions put forward were largely 
designed to address the symptoms of the problem and not its underlying cause. We now present 
further analysis to the issues which emerge from our case study data under three broad themes: 
health IT policy and practice, health IT stakeholders, and health IT auditing. 
5.1 Health IT policy and practice
The ten year study revealed many shifts in policy-making as key stakeholders, particularly cli-
nicians and patient representatives, became more vocal in their criticism of the NCRS. From 
a centralised approach beginning in 2002, the well-documented implementation challenges of 
the NPfIT (Hendy et al. 2005) resulted in the government announcing in 2011 the Program 
would be ‘dismantled into its separate component parts’ (NAO 2013). Each component pro-
gram would have its own senior responsible owner who would deliver and assess the benefits. 
The move from centralisation to de-centralisation coincided with large-scale structural and or-
ganisational change within the NHS, as strategic health authorities (SHAs) were abolished. 
Implementation plans were thwarted as two large IT contracts with Accenture and Fujitsu were 
terminated. While many commentators saw the NPfIT as ‘too big to fail’ as vast resources were 
allocated to the Program, the situation which emerged suggested one which was ‘too big to 
succeed’, particularly as governance arrangements for delivering the various systems became 
increasingly complicated, with suppliers not being paid until NHS Trusts confirmed they were 
deployed and working satisfactorily. While the challenge of translating health IT policy into 
practice in the NHS is discussed in the IS literature (Clegg and Shepherd 2007; Currie 2012a) 
this study raises further issues about the cultural conditions underlying high visibility programs 
in a risk-averse civil service setting, where problems become compounded by conflicting agendas 
among key stakeholders (Currie and Guah 2007). 
Despite this study commencing in 2002, with the expectation that a national health policy 
would be translated into a practical outcome, with clinicians and patients using EHRs, the key 
observation from this research finds that EHRs failed to be rolled out. As late as 2013, a NAO 
memorandum (NAO 2013: 4) “total costs (for the NPfIT) were significantly greater than 
total benefits”. In fact, the percentage of total estimated benefits still to be realised at March 
2012 divided into specific programs showed that, ‘additional services including Electronic Pre-
scription Service and Summary Care Record” was as high as 98% (i.e., yet to be realised). Such 
a large figure is noteworthy given the length of time (10 years) the program had already run. For 
IS researchers, the lessons from this study suggest that our longitudinal approach has identified 
many ebbs and flows in health IT policy where translation into practice is not guaranteed, de-
spite the numerous financial and human resources allocated to the program. While it is possible 
to identify specific causes of ‘the problem’ such as relatively low IT capability in government 
and the NHS resulting in poor decision-making, loosely defined (and changing) performance 
metrics (benefits and risks), conflicting political and managerial agenda among powerful stake-
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holder groups distributed within a federated network of complex organisations, these issues by 
themselves to not explain why significant parts of the NPfIT failed to be fully implemented. 
5.2 Health IT stakeholders
The NPfIT was made even more complex as government policy changes extended beyond the 
NHS IT strategy to include a root and branch restructuring the entire NHS organisation. The 
focus on user engagement by NHS Connecting for Health as a partial reason for low adoption 
became a key issue for those promoting the NPfIT. However, our findings concur with other 
studies which caution against framing research questions around ‘user engagement’ rather than 
focusing on how ‘infrastructures can be nurtured to support the co-production of service envi-
ronments within which such systems and artefacts might be better appropriated by their users’ 
(McLoughlin et al. 2012:19). 
A survey conducted three years into the NPfIT Program found that out of 1500 GPs in 
England, the majority of respondents knew little or nothing about the Choose & Book system 
designed to be used as an electronic appointments booking system for GPs and patients (NAO 
2005). NHS staff continued to report a lack of knowledge about the NPfIT. As a response, 
much attention was placed on user engagement of clinicians. Successive NAO reports (2006; 
2008; 2011) promoted the need to do more work on winning the hearts and minds of users. 
Even as late as 2008 a survey found that only one fifth of NHS respondents knew a ‘great deal’ 
about the Program, with three in ten reporting they ‘knew nothing’ (NAO 2008, p. 45). The 
response by NHS Connecting for Health was to develop more effective user engagement strat-
egies. This approach involved hiring seven national Clinical Leads to win support from four 
occupational groups in the NHS: GPs, hospital doctors, nurses and allied health professionals. 
Despite these efforts, a more nuanced understanding of clinicians’ concerns was aligned to issues 
of privacy and security, particularly in regard to access to patients’ health data. These concerns 
are increasingly documented in the IS literature Angst and Agarwal 2009) particularly as health 
data is increasingly moving across different regulatory jurisdictions as a result of cloud comput-
ing (Seddon and Currie 2012). Engaging users was not simply a mechanical exercise of ensuring 
that NHS staff was better informed about the NPfIT, but a much wider issue which necessitated 
a deeper understanding of the cultures and practices of clinical information systems design and 
implementation (Rivard et al. 2011).
However, we extend the notion of ‘users’ in this study to include health IT stakeholders. Our 
findings suggest that, while lack of user engagement was indeed a serious issue, the question of 
‘who is a user?’ was not adequately addressed by policy-makers and those charged with selling 
the benefits NPfIT throughout the NHS. With regard to EHRs, the ‘user’ of this technology was 
not only restricted to clinicians who would transition patient records from paper-based and/or 
other electronic storage to the NCRS, where the records would be stored on a national database. 
In addition, the users would also be patients, their health professionals (doctors, nurses, admin-
istrators) insurers, and potentially many others (i.e., persons caring for elderly, disabled friends/
relatives/guardians). The notion that more ‘user-engagement’ would lead to increased adoption 
of the NPfIT was therefore misguided. As the program gained more publicity in the media, so 
too did calls for greater involvement of potential users, i.e., patients. This debate became increas-
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ingly linked to patient data privacy and security, and the right to ‘opt-in’ by citizens to having 
their data stored nationally, as opposed to ‘implied consent’ which meant that, unless they for-
mally ‘opt-out’, their data will be transferred to the national database automatically. As leading 
advocacy groups among the medical profession called for greater rights for patients and their 
data to be kept private and secure, the concept of ‘users’ became much more politically loaded 
extending beyond the boundaries of NHS staff. This finding is important for IS researchers, not 
only because it suggests lessons about managing expectations within large-scale (or mega) IT 
projects but also for understanding the concepts of users and stakeholders, which may have very 
different roles and influences within the health IT domain.
5.3 Health IT auditing
Throughout the ten year period, the NPfIT underwent a series of audits. At the end of the 
program it was reported that, “total costs were significantly greater than total benefits” (NAO 
2013, p. 4). Measuring the benefits of the Program was problematic as benefits were perceived to 
‘go beyond simple cost savings’ to include those which were more difficult to identify, quantify 
and value. Statements of this nature suggest that NPfIT was launched without full knowledge or 
understanding of how information technology would improve health service delivery. Tracking 
the NPfIT from its inception in 2002 to 2011 found a shift in emphasis by NHS Connecting 
for Health. The initial thrust was to develop more effective procurement of IT in public services, 
particularly as this was perceived as an important area for building capability (Brennan 2005). 
This shifted towards benefits realisation ‘to drive benefits’ from the new systems as opposed to 
focusing only on ‘the practicalities of getting the systems deployed’ (NAO 2008, p. 30). The 
concept of benefits realisation emerged as concerns about poor return on investment from the 
NPfIT was raised by politicians, NHS staff, media and other groups. Again, the solution put 
forward by NHS connecting for Health was to better communicate the realised and potential 
benefits of NPfIT. This was done by NHS Clinical Leads by visiting health organizations, speak-
ing at conferences and workshops and developing supportive material. Our findings support 
other IS studies which show that decentralised or local support for health IT is likely to gener-
ate more benefits than a top-down, centralised approach (Aarts 2012; Damtew and Aanestad 
2012). As it became more difficult to demonstrate realised benefits from the NPfIT, as delays 
and further delays were announced, an interesting observation is the shift in emphasis to poten-
tial benefits, i.e., those that are currently unrealised but will be achieved in the future. 
Recognising that measuring the benefits was not straightforward, an assessment was made 
that two-thirds of the total estimated benefits were future benefits that would be realised at a 
later date (NAO 2013, p. 5). Further, as much as 98% of benefits for some of the programs 
were expected to accrue in the future (NAO 2013, p. 6). As a methodological challenge for IS 
researchers, it is noteworthy that official government documents identify three categories of 
benefits from health IT (cash-releasing benefits; non-cash releasing benefits and societal ben-
efits) (NAO 2013, p. 15). However, defining how these benefits are realised in the context of 
almost continuous shifts in policy-making, impacting on  almost all aspects of NHS service and 
IT delivery, poses a serious challenge, not only to NHS staff responsible for benefits realisation, 
but also for academic researchers making sense of the mis-match between health IT policy state-
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ments and IT implementation. While regular auditing of the NPfIT was seen as good practice, 
it is noteworthy that such exercises may activates deep tensions between clinical and professional 
groups within healthcare (Vikkelsø 2007).
One observation from our findings for IS researchers is that policy-makers were keen to 
make the link between health service delivery and IT suggesting that technology would play a 
major role in improving the NHS. However, little understanding of “who benefits?” from the 
NPfIT was understood in the wider context of incentives for different stakeholders. Interviews 
with a wide range of NHS personnel suggested that different stakeholders, i.e., clinicians, hospi-
tal managers, administrators, etc, tended to voice different opinions and views about the likely 
benefits of the NPfIT. This varied across the different projects, where more support was given to 
electronic systems for data storage of xrays and scans (the picture archiving and communication/
PACs) than for EHRs. Clinicians were also concerned about privacy and security issues about 
who can access patient data, and NHS executives showed concerns about the cost of the NPfIT 
in a climate of cost-cutting and restructuring. These findings suggest a more complex picture 
surrounding the issue of benefits realisation, where itemised benefits need to be matched against 
stakeholder interests and incentives for supporting change. Our findings therefore point to more 
emphasis on benefits incentives (and risks) as the failure to realise intended benefits was not 
directly a function of poorly configured technology.
6 Conclusion and future research
As one of the few longitudinal studies on health policy and IT, this research builds on the IS 
literature by demonstrating the various policy u-turns over a decade. It further questions the 
viability of large-scale, long term government IT projects. As the NPfIT became routinely re-
ferred to as a ‘computer failure’, our findings suggest that policy-makers need to develop a more 
integrated approach to IT if some of the pitfalls are to be avoided. While many academic studies 
advocate the socio-technical approach to health IT (Mantzana et al. 2007) where stakeholder 
roles are considered, our findings extend this work by including a policy dimension. 
This study found that government-led health IT policy failed to win supporters among key 
stakeholders for a variety of reasons. At the political level, the gap between policy development 
and implementation of the NPfIT grew larger as policy-makers failed to win support. Clinicians 
were not fully engaged in the decision-making process, and this made policy implementation 
increasingly difficult. This was a missed opportunity and proved very serious as clinicians mo-
bilised their supported through professionals organizations. At a business level, the case for 
support was not well made, and the emphasis on IT systems procurement initially obscured 
other considerations which emerged later, i.e., user engagement, benefits realisation and risk 
assessment. Organisationally, the fragmented structure of the NHS, coupled with almost con-
tinuous reorganisation, was not helpful in translating health IT policy into practice. Manage-
ment changes and the allocation of responsibility for the Program changed many times. At the 
technical level, poorly developed software design and implementation strategies with potential 
unforeseen consequences (i.e., where patient safety could be compromised) (Bate, and Robert 
2006) led clinicians to become more ‘risk averse’ to the NCRS. 
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For IS researchers looking to extend work on health IT policy and implementation, this pa-
per offers four potential areas. First, the policy-practice relationship is a fruitful area, particularly 
as single-site case studies are unlikely to generate results which extend beyond narrow manage-
ment practice. This research points to the mismatch between the original policy statements for 
NPfIT and the outcome. A longitudinal approach offers a robust and fruitful way to capture the 
many ebbs and flows in policy-making (Berg 2003) often resulting from factors like economic 
pressures for cost-cutting. Second, the tensions between medical professionalism and market 
driven healthcare show that change management programs need to gain support by clinicians 
and patients (Currie 2012a). Our study shows that ‘user engagement’ became important, but 
this was pursued mechanically where health policy-makers and managers used a simple logic 
that, if users knew more about NPfIT, their support for the Program would increase. How-
ever, a more nuanced approach to user engagement was required to unpick the more complex 
political and professional motivations among health stakeholders (McLoughlin et al. 2012). 
Third, research is needed on the development and deployment of EHRs particularly as evidence 
from around the world shows that despite government investment and adoption levels remain 
relatively low (Jha et al. 2009; DesRoches et al. 2012). Comparative-country analysis work 
on adoption and diffusion of eHealth is likely to identify areas where eHealth, for example, is 
gaining traction, and also examples where more resources are needed (Berg 2003). As eHealth 
benchmarking is becoming more important, IS researchers can offer policy-makers a more nu-
anced and detailed account of health IT implementations, recognizing that success and failure 
factors are more likely to be politically-driven rather than resulting from IT failures (Currie 
2012b). Fourth, ethnographies may capture the priorities and views of clinicians and patients 
in moving towards consumer-driven healthcare. As health and social care becomes more closely 
aligned across many countries, IS research is needed on how health consumers engage with new 
technologies, i.e., mobile devices and cloud computing. 
Our longitudinal approach to evaluating the policy-technology intersection of the NPfIT 
provides an illuminating example of how government health IT policy underwent a series of 
re-evaluation as initial targets and deadlines proved increasingly difficult to meet. As health IT 
policy in the UK NHS has now shifted from ‘top-down’ to ‘local ownership’, new problems of 
lack of integration and interoperability of health technologies will re-emerge (Berg 2003). By 
2012, the NPfIT had cost around £7.3 bn (NAO 2013) and was several years late. As health 
IT policy now allows for greater flexibility and control of IT systems at local level, with more 
choice of IT suppliers, new challenges lie ahead. With citizens increasingly encouraged to exer-
cise more choice about their health, policy-makers will need to recognize that patient data will 
increasingly move with the individual, possibly across different legal and regulatory jurisdictions 
(i.e., national borders). Health policy-makers and providers will therefore need to address these 
new challenges where the current localized approach becomes conflicted with pan-European or 
even an international health environment suggesting a move back to centralization. 
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